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THE BANKING CONTRACT AS A SPECIAL CONTRACT:  





The banker-customer relationship is a contractual relationship 
based on a contract between the parties.
1
  As a contractual 
relationship, it is governed by contract law.
2
  However, contract law 
does not provide the customer with the protection he or she requires 
against the bank.
3
  Therefore, the Israeli courts have adopted a unique 
approach in determining that the banking contract is a special 
contract—a fiduciary contract.
4
  Under a fiduciary contract, the bank, 
as a fiduciary, is subject to a fiduciary duty vis-à-vis the beneficiary, 
the customer.
5
  The fiduciary duty imposes a very high standard of 
behavior on the bank, much higher than the standard imposed on it 
under contract law.  By adopting a fiduciary approach, the customer 
is granted very wide protection against the bank. 
 
* Ruth Plato-Shinar is a law professor, founder, and director of the Center for Banking Law, 
Netanya Academic College, Israel.  This Article was presented in a symposium entitled 
“Law of Contracts or Laws of Contracts?” that took place at Netanya Academic College, 
Israel, in December 2011. 
1 E.P. ELLINGER, E. LOMNICKA, C.V.M. HARE, ELLINGER’S MODERN BANKING LAW 119 
(5th ed. 2011) [hereinafter ELLINGER ET AL., ELLINGER’S MODERN BANKING LAW]; RUTH 
PLATO-SHINAR, THE BANK’S FIDUCIARY DUTY: THE DUTY OF LOYALTY 38 (2010) 
[hereinafter PLATO-SHINAR, THE BANK’S FIDUCIARY DUTY]. 
2 ELLINGER ET AL., ELLINGER’S MODERN BANKING LAW, supra note 1. 
3 Ruth Plato-Shinar, An Angel Named “The Bank”: The Bank’s Fiduciary Duty as the 
Basic Theory in Israeli Banking Law, 36 COMMON L. WORLD REV. 27 (2007) [hereinafter 
Plato-Shinar, An Angel Named “The Bank”] (“The courts in Israel have stressed the 
tremendous power which the bank wields over its customers, the trust which the customer 
places in the bank and the almost blind reliance of the customer on the bank’s advice.”). 
4 Id. at 27, 29. 
5 Id. 
1
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This Article is structured as follows: Part II describes the 
stages of development of the Israeli legal approach to the bank-
customer relationship from a general contractual approach to a 
fiduciary approach.  Part III focuses on the banking contract as a 
fiduciary contract.  It analyzes the justifications put forward by 
Israeli courts for the adoption of the fiduciary approach (i.e., the 
unique characteristics of the banking contract).  It explains the nature 
of the fiduciary duty imposed on the bank and the scope thereof, and 
it describes the remedies granted to the customer in cases of a breach 
of the fiduciary contract.  Part IV focuses on the bank’s duty of 
disclosure.  It compares the general contractual duty of disclosure to 
its counterpart under the fiduciary regime.  Part V concludes that the 
recognition of the banking contract as a special fiduciary contract 
will lead to the creation of fair and proper banking practices. 
II. FROM A GENERAL CONTRACTUAL APPROACH TO A 
FIDUCIARY APPROACH 
A. The General Contractual Approach 
The banker-customer relationship is a contractual 
relationship.
6
  It is created by engaging in a contract and continues to 
exist as long as the contract is in effect and comes to an end upon the 
termination of the contract.
7
  Because the relationship is contractual, 
it is governed by contract law.
8
 
However, the implementation of contract law in the banking 
context creates a problem: contract law does not take into 
consideration situations of inequality of power between the parties.
9
  
Contract law determines arrangements that seek to balance the 
interests of the contracting parties based on the presumption that they 
are equal in power.
10
  In situations of a serious power disparity 
 
6 ELLINGER ET AL., ELLINGER’S MODERN BANKING LAW, supra note 1. 
7 Plato-Shinar, An Angel Named “The Bank,” supra note 3, at 36. 
8 See Contracts (General Part) Law, 5733-1973, 27 LSI 117 (1972-1973) (Isr.) (defining a 
contract); see also Contract (Remedies for Breach of Contract) Law, 5731-1970, 25 LSI 11 
(1970) (Isr.) (applying when a contract has been broken); Pledges Law, 5727-1967, 17 LSI 
44 (1967) (Isr.) (applying to pledges and mortgages); Agency Law, 5725-1965, 19 LSI 231 
(1965) (Isr.) (applying when the bank acts as a customer’s agent); Bailees Law, 5727-1967 
21 LSI 49 (1967) (Isr.) (applying when the bank acts as a bailor for the customer). 
9 Plato-Shinar, An Angel Named “The Bank,” supra note 3, at 35. 
10 DANIEL FRIEDMAN & NILI COHEN, CONTRACTS 59, 128 (1991) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN & 
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between the parties, these laws do not provide any particular 
protection for the weaker party.  As will be explained later, the bank-
customer relationship is characterized by a huge inequality of power, 
and therefore contract law is not an appropriate tool for the regulation 
of this contractual relationship.
11
 
Moreover, contract law is not jus cogens and therefore 
contractual derogation is permitted.
12
  Hence, even if one of these 
laws contains a clause that aims to protect one of the parties to the 
contract, it can be assumed that in a situation of a disparity of power, 
the stronger party would contract out of such a clause.  Indeed, this is 
the situation in the banking context; banks used to make stipulations 
regarding various statutory clauses in order to protect their interests 
and to minimize their liability.
13
 
There are some exceptions to this rule.  A few clauses in the 
Contracts (General Part) Law
14
 may provide the banking customer 





 or the prohibition against 
exploitation.
17
  These clauses seek to establish a proper and fair 
standard of behavior and therefore they are jus cogens.  But however 
useful these clauses are, they are only isolated clauses and do not 
provide adequate protection for the banking customer. 
Another contractual tool that may protect the banking 
customer is the Standard Contracts Law.
18
  This law applies to 
banking contracts, which are standard contracts.
19
  Sections 3 and 4 
of this law authorize courts to “annul or change any condition of a 
standard contract which . . . involves an undue disadvantage to 
customers or an unfair advantage for the supplier, which is likely to 
                                                                                                                                      
COHEN, CONTRACTS]. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 125; GABRIELA SHALEV, THE LAW OF CONTRACT—GENERAL PART 50 (2005) 
[hereinafter SHALEV, THE LAW OF CONTRACT]. 
13 SHALEV, THE LAW OF CONTRACT, supra note 12. 
14 See generally Contracts (General Part) Law, 5733-1973, 27 LSI 117 (1972-1973) (Isr.). 
15 Id. at §§ 12, 39. 
16 Id. at § 15. 
17 Id. at § 18. 
18 Standard Contracts Law, 5743-1982 37 LSI 6 (1982) (Isr.). 
19 Id. at § 2 (defining the term “standard contract” as “the text of a contract, all or some of 
the conditions of which were determined in advance by one party, in order to serve as 
conditions of many contracts between him and persons unidentified as to number or 
identity”). 
3
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lead to the customers’ deprivation.”
20
  But attempts to attack clauses 
of banking contracts on the ground that they are unfair usually fail.
21
  
The courts have adopted a very conservative attitude in the 
implementation of the law.
22
  They usually prefer not to intervene in 
the content of the banking contract and avoid removing depriving 
contractual clauses from banking contracts.
23
  The banks have taken 
advantage of the court’s passive attitude and have continued using 
contracts that include unfair clauses.
24
 
In summary, from an empirical point of view, the use of 
contract law in banking disputes has neither created a proper balance 
between the banks and their customers, nor has it provided the 
customer with a suitable level of protection.
25
 
B. Banking (Service to Customer) Law, 5741-198126 
The experience accumulated in the implementation of the 
contractual approach to the bank-customer relationship reveals that 
true protection for the customer requires a specific and cogent 
arrangement.
27
  Indeed, this was the rationale behind the enactment 
of the Banking (Service to Customer) Law.
28
  This law is the main 
law that regulates the contractual relationship between the bank and 
the customer.
29
  It is intended to solve the problem of power disparity 
 
20 Id. at §§ 3-4. 
21 Sinai Deutch, Bank-Customer Relationship: Contractual and Consumer Aspects, in A 




24 The courts’ attitude may change now as a result of several judgments that have been 
delivered recently by the Special Tribunal for Standard Contracts.  See, e.g., File No. 195/97, 
Att’y Gen. v. Bank Leumi (2004) Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.) (holding that 
after examining the bank’s checking account agreement, dozens of clauses deprived the 
customers and must be removed or altered); see also CA 6916/04 Bank Leumi Le-Israel Ltd. 
v. Att’y Gen.  [2010] (Isr.); CA 8002/02 Supervisor of Banks v. First Int’l Bank Ltd. PD 
[2009] (Isr.) (holding that many of the clauses in a housing loan agreement deprive 
customers of their rights, pending an appeal in the Israeli Supreme Court). 
25 Sinai Deutch, Bank-Customer Relationship, supra note 21, at 164, 169, 170-71, 192, 
194. 
26 Banking (Service to Customer) Law, 5741-1981, 35 LSI 312 (1981) (Isr.). 
27 PLATO-SHINAR, THE BANK’S FIDUCIARY DUTY, supra note 1, at 39. 
28 Ruth Plato-Shinar, Banking (Service to Customer) Law 1981: On the Absence of a 
Fiduciary Duty, HUKIM-J. ON LEGIS. (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Plato-Shinar, Banking 
(Service to Customer) Law 1981]. 
29 Id. 
4
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between the parties and to ensure that the bank does not abuse it to 
the detriment of the customer.
30
 
The Banking (Service to Customer) Law includes a long line 
of protective clauses for the customer, such as the prohibition against 
misleading;
31
 the prohibition against injury in specific 
circumstances;
32
 the duty to disclose details of the banking 
transaction;
33
 a duty to provide certain banking services;
34
 a 
prohibition against making a service conditional on another service;
35
 
determining methods for calculating interest and the dates for 
entering debits and credits;
36
 restrictions and responsibility regarding 
advertising;
37
 etc.  “The provisions of this Law” are cogent and 
applicable notwithstanding “any waiver or agreement to the 
contrary.”
38
  It has furthermore been prescribed that any breach of the 
provisions confers the civil remedy of compensation on the aggrieved 
customer.
39
  In addition, it may constitute a criminal offense on the 
part of the bank, its managers, and its senior officials.
40
  Another 
important tool that has been prescribed by the law is the certification 
of the supervisor of banks to examine inquiries by the public 
concerning their transactions with the bank, and, in cases where the 




However, even the Banking (Service to Customer) Law does 
not afford the customer full protection.  The law addresses specific 
issues and does not provide the customer with sweeping protection.
42
  
It does not address common problems such as the provision of non-
objective financial advice or the complex matter of conflicts of 
interest in banking activities.
43
  Moreover, some of the sections 
 
30 Id. 
31 Banking (Service to Customer) Law § 3. 
32 Id. at § 4. 
33 Id. at § 5. 
34 Id. at § 2. 
35 Id. at § 7. 
36 Banking (Service to Customer) Law § 8. 
37 Id. at § 6. 
38 Id. at § 17. 
39 Id. at § 15. 
40 Id. at §§ 10, 11. 
41 Banking (Service to Customer) Law § 16. 
42 Plato-Shinar, Banking (Service to Customer) Law 1981, supra note 28. 
43 Ruth Plato-Shinar, The Bank’s Fiduciary Duty Under Israeli Law: Is There a Need to 
Transform it from an Equitable Principle Into a Statutory Duty?, 41 COMMON L. WORLD 
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included in the law are drafted vaguely, resulting in their scope not 
being sufficiently defined; for example, section 3, which prohibits 
misleading.
44
  It is disputed whether this section imposes an active 
duty of disclosure on the bank.
45
  Another problem that arises with 
this law is that the only remedy it provides is compensation.
46
  It does 
not include other basic remedies such as rescission of the contract.
47
 
The enactment of the Banking (Service to Customer) Law 
reflected the view of the legislator that the banking customer should 
be given special protection.  The courts have continued in this 
direction and have implemented this concept by adopting the 
fiduciary approach.
48
  As will be shown in Part III, the classification 
of the banking contract as a fiduciary contract can solve the 
aforementioned problems and provide the customer with the 
protection he or she needs.
49
 
C. The Doctrine of Consumer Protection 
The two laws mentioned above, the Standard Contracts Law 
and the Banking (Services to Customer) Law, reflect an important 
trend that started to gain momentum in Israel in the 1980’s: the trend 
towards consumer protection. 
Underlying this trend is the disparity of power between the 
dealer and the consumer.  The starting point is the consumer’s 
inability to deal with the sophisticated markets of the modern world 
due to changes in market structure, technological innovations, and 
the variety of products and services.  The inequality between the 
parties is due not only to the dealer’s more substantial economic 
power, but also to factors such as the complexity of the transaction, 
the expertise of the dealer in the relevant field, and the lack of 
feasibility for the consumer to negotiate on the contract because of 
                                                                                                                                      
REV. 219, 236-41 (2012) [hereinafter Plato-Shinar, The Bank’s Fiduciary Duty] (discussing 
lack of consumer protection); see Plato-Shinar, Banking (Service to Customer) Law 1981, 
supra note 28. 
44 Banking (Service to Customer) Law § 3 (prohibiting misleading without defining it). 
45 PLATO-SHINAR, THE BANK’S FIDUCIARY DUTY, supra note 1, at 243; see also infra Part 
IV. 
46 Plato-Shinar, Banking (Service to Customer) Law 1981, supra note 28. 
47 Id. 
48 Ruth Plato-Shinar & Rolf H. Weber, Three Models of the Bank’s Fiduciary Duty, 2 L. 
& FIN. MARKETS REV. 422, 428 (2008) [hereinafter Plato-Shinar & Weber, Three Models]. 
49 Id. at 432. 
6
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the low chances of success in such negotiations.
50
  The weakness of 
the consumer is reflected in various areas: both at the stage of the 
formation of the legal norm and at the stage of exercising it; on an 
individual level as well as on a group level; and in terms of 
bargaining power as well as in terms of informational gaps.
51
 
Nevertheless, the inferiority of the consumer alone is not a 
good enough reason for the intervention of the law.  The law should 
intervene only out of concern that the inferiority of the consumer 
could be abused by the dealer.  The consumer protection law seeks to 
minimize the situations where the power of the dealer is abused by 
imposing limitations on the dealer’s conduct.
52
  The traditional 
justification for the special protection of the consumer’s interest is 
therefore protection against exploitation of the consumer’s relative 
weakness.
53
  The freedom of contract is undermined due to the need 
for intervention aimed at providing protection for the consumer, 
whose inferior position may be exploited by the dealer. 
The Israeli courts have incorporated this rationale in various 
contexts, including in the banking field.
54
  The recognition of the 
banking contract as a fiduciary contract is a reflection of this trend. 
D. The Fiduciary Approach 
In the 1980s, the perception of the banking contract as a 
fiduciary contract began to emerge in Israel.
55
  The courts realized 
that the existing contractual tools did not provide the unique 
protection required by the banking customer.
56
  The courts 
acknowledged that effective protection of the bank’s customer 
required a different legal basis.
57
  The solution to this was found in 




50 SINAI DEUTCH, CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW—FOUNDATIONS AND PRINCIPLES 52-53, 
125-26 (2001) [hereinafter SINAI DEUTCH, CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW]. 
51 ORNA DEUTCH, CONSUMER LEGAL PROTECTION 87-118, 537 (2003) [hereinafter ORNA 
DEUTCH, CONSUMER LEGAL PROTECTION]. 
52 Id. at 129-32, 538; SINAI DEUTCH, CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW, supra note 50, at 120. 
53 ORNA DEUTCH, CONSUMER LEGAL PROTECTION, supra note 51, at 87-118, 537. 
54 Plato-Shinar & Weber, Three Models, supra note 48, at 424. 
55 See id. at 429 (citing CA 1/75 Israel Mortg. Bank Ltd. v. Hershko 29(2) PD 208 [1975] 
(Isr.) (showing the first case in Israel acknowledging the fiduciary duty of banks)). 
56 Id. at 432. 
57 Id. 
58 See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 
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Israeli courts ruled that the banking contract is a unique 
contract: a fiduciary contract.
59
  The fiduciary contract imposes on 
the bank, as a fiduciary, a very high standard of behavior: a fiduciary 
duty towards its customer.
60
  The fiduciary duty is intended to curb 
the power of the bank and to make sure that the bank does not abuse 
it to the detriment of the customer.  The fiduciary duty serves as a 
complementary and correcting standard where conventional contract 
law has failed.  “Its draft as an obscure standard left the courts with 
an extensive area for discretion and casuistic application, and they 
applied it in a manner consistent with basic human and social 
attitudes.”
61
  The fiduciary duty has been “recognize[d] . . . as a 
justified and worthy instrument” for the protection of the bank’s 
customers, and courts have used it in an ever increasing number of 
cases.
62
  “Over the years, the fiduciary duty has been established as a 
basic theory in Israeli banking laws.”
63
 
III. THE BANKING CONTRACT AS A FIDUCIARY CONTRACT 
A. The Nature of the Fiduciary Duty 
The classification of the banking contract as a fiduciary 
contract imposes on the bank, as a fiduciary, a special duty towards 
its beneficiary—the customer—a fiduciary duty. 
The bank’s fiduciary duty sets a very high standard of 
conduct for the bank, obligating it to act with integrity, fairness, 
professionalism, and skill.  However, at the heart of the duty stands 
the duty to exercise the power vested in the bank without abuse.  The 
key words are loyalty and fidelity.  “The bank ‘as a fiduciary’ is 
required to perform its duties solely for the purpose for which the 
power was vested in it, without ulterior motives and while protecting 
                                                                                                                                      
DUKE L.J. 879, 879 (1988); Scott FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, 
82 MARQ. L. REV. 303, 303 (1999); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 
OR. L. REV. 1209, 1211 (1995); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795 
(1983) [hereinafter Frankel, Fiduciary Law] (regarding the relation between the general 
contract law and the fiduciary obligation in the general context). 
59 Plato-Shinar, An Angel Named “The Bank,” supra note 3, at 27. 
60 Id. at 29. 




Touro Law Review, Vol. 29 [2013], No. 3, Art. 13
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss3/13
2013] THE BANKING CONTRACT 729 
the interest of the beneficiary—the customer.”
64
  The bank must act 
for the best interest of the customer.  “Moreover, the bank must 




Requiring a person to act for the beneficiary’s interest 
and to prefer the beneficiary’s interest to his or her 
own personal interest is a particularly stringent one.  
Both private civil law and common law in Israel have 
no obligation that sets a conduct threshold higher than 
the fiduciary duty. . . .  The fiduciary duty is a 
stringent obligation also when compared to the duty of 
care that lies at the base of the tort of negligence, 
because the duty of care requires the taking of 
reasonable precautions only, and nothing more.  Thus, 
while the duty of care is intended to prevent damage, 
the fiduciary duty is intended to prevent a person from 
abusing his power.  It is therefore possible for a 





“The fiduciary duty determines a standard of conduct higher 
than the duty of good faith,” which was adopted in Israel from 
German law.
67
  “[W]hile the duty of good faith requires a person to 
act fairly in the course of pursuing his or her own personal interest, 
the fiduciary duty requires that person to prefer the interest of the 
other to his or her own personal interest.”
68
  No wonder the fiduciary 
 
64 Plato-Shinar, An Angel Named “The Bank,” supra note 3, at 29 (quoting CA 6830/11 
Baranovitz v. Teomim, 57(5) PD 691, 700-01 [2003] (Isr.)); see Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 
supra note 58 (discussing the nature of the fiduciary duty in general). 
65 Plato-Shinar, An Angel Named “The Bank,” supra note 3, at 29; see Klaus J. Hopt, 
Trusteeship and Conflicts of Interest in Corporate, Banking and Agency Law Toward 
Common Legal Principles for Intermediaries in the Modern Service-Oriented Society, in 
REFORMING COMPANY AND TAKEOVER LAW IN EUROPE 51, 77 (Guido Ferrarini et al. eds., 
2004); Aharon Barak, Conflicts of Interest in the Performance of Duties, 10 MISHPATIM 11 
(1980). 
66 Plato-Shinar, An Angel Named “The Bank,” supra note 3, at 30 (citing CA 610/94 
Buchbinder v. Official Receiver 57(4) PD 289, 33 [2003] (Isr.)). 
67 Id.; Ricardo Ben-Oliel, Foreign Influences in Israeli Banking Law, 23 TUL. EUR. & CIV. 
L.F. 167, 167-68 (2008). 
68 Plato-Shinar, An Angel Named “The Bank,” supra note 3, at 30 (citing Buchbinder, 
57(4) PD at 332; M. Rubinstein & B. Okon, The Bank as a Social Agency, in SHAMGAR 
BOOK—ARTICLES Part C 819, 821 (2003)). 
9
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duty was recognized as an altruistic duty, and was described by the 
metaphor of “an angel’s behavior.”
69
 
B. Justifications for the Classification of the Banking 
Contract as a Fiduciary Contract 
Israeli courts have based the classification of the banking 
contract as a fiduciary contract on a variety of justifications and legal 
theories.
70
  They emphasize the trust that the customer has in the 
bank and the reliance (sometimes blind) on the bank’s advice—the 
“theory of trust and reliance.”
71
  They mention the control that the 
bank has over the customer’s financial assets and economic interests 
(“the theory of control”).
72
  Israeli courts see the banks as quasi-
public bodies and, as a result, they impose a particularly high 
standard of conduct on them.
73
  However, it appears as if the main 
reason for the court’s special approach to the banking contract is the 
great inequality of power between the parties to the contract.
74
 
A huge disparity of power exists between the banks and most 
of their customers.
75
  There are huge differences in the level of 
 
69 Id. (citing AHARON BARAK, JUDICIAL DISCRETION 497 (1987)). 
70 See id. at 35 (exploring the justifications given by Israeli courts); Ruth Plato-Shinar, 
The Bank’s Duty of Disclosure Towards a New Model, 27 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 427 
(2012) [hereinafter Plato-Shinar, The Bank’s Duty]; Ariel Porath, The Responsibility of the 
Banks in Respect of Negligence: Recent Developments, in HAMISHPAT YEAR BOOK 1992-
1993, 324 (1994) [hereinafter Porath, The Responsibility of the Banks]. 
71 Plato-Shinar, An Angel Named “The Bank,” supra note 3, at 33-34; CA 1570/92 United 
Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Ziegler 49(1) PD 369, 384 [1995] (Isr.); 195/97, Att’y Gen. at ¶ 4. 
72 Compare Plato-Shinar, An Angel Named “The Bank,” supra note 3, at 34, with CA 
817/79 Kosoi v. Y.L. Feuchtwanger Bank Ltd. 38(3) PD 253, 278 [1984] (Isr.), and HCJ 
531/79 Likud Faction v. Petach Tikva City Council 34(2) PD 566, 570 [1980] (Isr.). 
73 Plato-Shinar, An Angel Named “The Bank,” supra note 3, at 35; CA 5379/95 Sahar Ins. 
Co. v. Isr. Disc. Bank 51(4) PD 464, 476-77 [1997] (Isr.); CA 8068/01 Ayalon Ins. Co. Ltd. 
v. Ex’r of the Estate of the Late Oppelgar 59(2) PD 349, 369 [2004] (Isr.). 
74 Plato-Shinar, An Angel Named “The Bank,” supra note 3, at 35; see Lloyds Bank v. 
Bundy, [1975] Q.B. 326 (Eng.) (rejecting this argument explicitly in England’s House of 
Lords as a basis for imposing a fiduciary duty on the banks); overruled by Nat’l Westminster 
Bank Plc. v. Morgan, (1983) 3 All E.R. 85 (Eng.), rev’d (1985) 1 A.C. 686 (Eng.) 
(preferring the doctrine of unequal bargaining power to that of the fiduciary duty); CA 
5893/91 Tefahot Isr. Mortg. Bank Ltd. v. Tzabach 48(2) PD 573, 591-92 [1994] (Isr.); 
195/97, Att’y Gen. at ¶ 4; Opening Motion CrimC (TA) 431/01 Isr. Ass’n of Banks v. Isr. 
Sec. Auth., PM 2002(2) 529, 548 (2002) (Isr.); CA 6234/00 Sh.A.P. Ltd. v. Bank Leumi Le-
Israel Ltd. 57(6) PD 769, 788 [2003] (Isr.); see also CA 1304/91 Tefahot Isr. Mortg. Bank 
Ltd. v. Liepart 47(3) PD 309, 322 [1993] (Isr.) (regarding a guarantor). 
75 Plato-Shinar, An Angel Named “The Bank,” supra note 3, at 35.  We should not ignore 
the existence of customers who possess financial and economic power that compares with 
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professional knowledge, technical methods of managing and 
monitoring financial activities, financial power, bargaining power, 
and so on.  The customer’s inferiority in his dealings with the bank 
characterizes every stage of their relationship from the negotiation 
stage through to the signing of the banking contract, the execution 
period of the contract, and up until the termination of the 
relationship.  The customer’s inferiority is also reflected in instances 
of legal disputes with the bank given the existence of a great 
inequality in the financial ability to conduct legal proceedings and the 
difficulties of proof that stem from the lack of full information; this is 
due to the inferiority in the bargaining position in the negotiation 
stage and the lack of previous experience in legal conflicts.
76
 
We have, therefore, seen the great inequality that exists 
between the bank and the typical customer.  However, inequality of 
power alone is not a sufficient reason for the intervention of the law.  
The intervention of the law is justified only where the inequality of 
power is accompanied by a genuine concern that the party holding 
the power may unfairly take advantage of the weaker party.
77
 
Moreover, the power inequality becomes problematic when it 
creates a dependency of the inferior party on the stronger party.  
                                                                                                                                      
the strength of the banks, such as the large corporations or wealthy families.  These are 
sophisticated customers who have the power to purchase professional counselling services 
and inspection services, and who have bargaining power in their dealings with those banks 
that wish to acquire them as customers.  A comparison of the relative power of the bank and 
the customer in such cases should, apparently, lead to the conclusion of denying a fiduciary 
duty in relation to these customers.  However, this is not so.  Israeli courts have used the 
justification of the inequality of power between the banks and the customer as a typical 
justification that does not require examination of every case on the merits.  The courts view 
the inferiority of the customer as “sector based inferiority” and they apply the justification of 
the inequality of power as an assumption that cannot be contradicted with respect to each 
and every customer.  See CA 7424/96 Mizrahi United Bank Ltd. v. Eliahu Garziani (1988) 
Co. Ltd. 54(2) PD 145, 161-62 [2000] (Isr.); 195/97, The Att’y Gen. at ¶ 4 (recognizing the 
inequality of power with respect to all of the bank’s customers, and particularly with respect 
to retail customers).  Compare CC (Jer) 2452/00 Bank Leumi Le Israel Ltd. v. Stukman 
Takdin District, 2006(4), 2822, ¶ 12 (2006) (Isr.) (acknowledging the inequality of power 
with respect to a business customer who was assisted by financial professionals), with ORNA 
DEUTCH, CONSUMERISM 536-37 (2001) [hereinafter ORNA DEUTCH, CONSUMERISM] 
(discussing the “typical inferiority” of the consumer vis-à-vis the dealer). 
76 ORNA DEUTCH, CONSUMERISM, supra note 75, at 537; see also Plato-Shinar, An Angel 
Named “The Bank,” supra note 3, at 33, 36. 
77 ORNA DEUTCH, CONSUMERISM, supra note 75, at 129-32, 538; Sinai Deutch, Bank-
Customer Relationship, supra note 21, at 120; see also Plato-Shinar, An Angel Named “The 
Bank,” supra note 3, at 35; Plato-Shinar, The Bank’s Fiduciary Duty, supra note 43, at 225-
26 (stating that, unfortunately, there are more than a few examples for such a behavior that 
was executed by Israeli banks). 
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Indeed, the tremendous power given to the bank creates a real 
dependency of the customer.  The customer is dependent on the bank 
in the provision of the service, the manner in which it is performed, 
the determination of the price, as well as in the determination of the 
legal arrangement that applies to it, as set forth hereunder.
78
 
1. The Provision of the Service 
A discretion is conferred upon the bank to agree or refuse to 
carry out the banking transaction that the customer requests.  Indeed, 
section 2 of the Banking (Customer Service) Law requires the bank 
to provide the customer with certain services, but this section is quite 
limited and applies only to three types of services: receiving a 
monetary deposit in Israeli currency or in foreign currency; selling 
bank checks; and opening and managing current accounts.
79
  With 
respect to opening a current account, the obligation to provide the 
service is very limited and does not include providing credit, issuing 
checkbooks for the account, or providing a debit card.
80
  Hence, in 
most of the transactions, the customer is dependent on the bank’s 
willingness to provide the service requested.  A customer’s 
dependence on the service provider is not exclusive to the banking 
sector and therefore it is insufficient per se to justify the imposition 
of a fiduciary duty.
81
  However, what distinguishes it in the banking 
context is the fact that this is a dependency that relates to the 
provision of services essential to the public.
82
  There is not a person 
 
78 Sinai Deutch, Protection of the Bank Customer: By Statute or by Ethical Codes—Which 
is Preferable?  An Israeli Perspective, 2 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 419, 424 (2004) 
[hereinafter Sinai Deutch, Protection of the Bank Customer]; Tzabach, 48(2) PD at 591; CA 
122/84 Mantzur v. Israel 38(4) PD 94, 101 [1984] (Isr.); RICARDO BEN-OLIEL, BANKING 
LAW—GENERAL PART 84 (1996) [hereinafter BEN-OLIEL, BANKING LAW].  This is true also 
with respect to business customers such as companies.  See Committee for Establishing 
PARAMETERS FOR INST’L BODIES’ INVS. IN NONGOVERNMENTAL BONDS, Final Report at 73 
(2010), available at http://www.mof.gov.il/Insurance%20_savings/Pages/HodakCommitteeReport.aspx. 
79 Banking (Service to Customer) Law § 2(a). 
80 See id. (noting that a banking corporation does not have to provide credit). 
81 Plato-Shinar, The Bank’s Fiduciary Duty, supra note 43, at 227. 
82 See Plato-Shinar & Weber, Three Models, supra note 48, at 429 (explaining that many 
duties are provided banks to the general public); Banking (Service to Customers) 
(Amendment No. 12) (Enhancement of Competition) 2007, Official Bills 76, 77 (Isr.); A. 
WEINROT & B. MEDINA, LENDING LAWS—THE BORROWER’S PROTECTION IN ISRAELI LAW 98 
(1990); see also Commercial Cotton Co. v. United Cal. Bank, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551, 554 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1985) (showing the American approach).  Compare Cecil. J. Hunt, II, The Price of 
Trust: An Examination of Fiduciary Duty and the Lender-Borrower Relationship, 29 WAKE 
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or an entity today that does not require banking services in one way 
or another.  Even a person who does not require business finance or 
complicated transactions needs a mortgage, a bank guarantee, 
investment counseling for small savings, or the possibility of making 
payments by means of direct debit orders.  Even those customers 
whose financial activities are limited to receiving a salary as an 
employee or receiving an allowance from the National Insurance 
Institute need bank accounts if they cannot receive the payment in 
cash.  This essentiality of the banking services increases the 
customers’ dependence on the bank. 
2. The Manner of the Performance of the 
Service 
The customer is unable to effectively supervise the bank’s 
activities either because the customer lacks the professional know-
how and technical means required or because the customer usually 
receives information about what is happening in his account only 
retrospectively.  Thus, even hiring professional inspection services, 
which involve a high financial cost, will not solve the problem of 
supervision.
83
  The customer is left with no alternative but to rely on 
the professionalism and integrity of the bank in performing its duties. 
3. The Prices of the Banking Services 
The prices of banking services available to the client are 
prescribed by the bank.
84
  For years the banks have used their 
influence as the mainstay of the Israeli economy to increase their 
profits, mostly at the expense of the retail sector, which is perceived 
as the weaker party in terms of bargaining power in dealings with the 
bank.
85
  From the conclusions of the Parliamentary Investigative 
                                                                                                                                      
FOREST L. REV. 719, 775-76 (1994) (showing the American approach), with Kenneth W. 
Curtis, The Fiduciary Controversy: Injection of Fiduciary Principles into the Bank-
Depositor and Bank-Borrower Relationships, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 795, 816-18 (1987). 
83 Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 58, at 812-14 (suggesting that one possible way of 
controlling a fiduciary may be by contract, but noting that there are deficiencies with this 
arrangement); Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its 
Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1049 (1991) 
(recognizing the difficulty with monitoring an agent). 
84 Banking (Service to Customer) Law § 9(i). 
85 See THE REPORT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY INTERROGATORY COMMITTEE REGARDING THE 
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Commission, it emerges that the banks used their market power to 
charge households and small businesses high fees and interest rates.
86
  
As a result, the Commission determined that “Israeli households pay 
‘a lack-of-competition fee’ when purchasing bank services.”
87
  In the 
absence of competition between the banks, there was almost no 
difference between the fees charged by the various banks.
88
  The 
multiplicity of fees charged by each bank for financial and 
operational services, as well as the billing of duplicate charges for the 
same service, added to the damage caused to the customer.
89
  In 
2007, the Banking (Customer Service) Law was amended and 
authority was thereby conferred on the Bank of Israel to oversee the 
fees charged to households and small businesses (the “bank-fees 
reform”).
90
  By virtue of this authority, the Governor of the Bank of 
Israel published the Banking (Service to Customer) (Bank Fees) 
Rules,
91
 which include details of the schedule of fees that can be 
charged, while allowing the banks discretion to determine the amount 
of the fees and the rate thereof.
92
  However, it transpired that some 
banks took advantage of the bank fees reform by increasing their 
fees.
93
  In addition, with regard to various charges, there remains no 
real significant difference among the prices of the different banks.
94
  
This phenomenon of the great similarity between the bank charges 
was the subject of an investigation by the Antitrust Authority.
95
  As a 
result of a lengthy investigation that lasted several years, the 
                                                                                                                                      
BANKING FEES at 9, 18-20, available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/committees/heb/docs/bank 
_inq.pdf [hereinafter THE REPORT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY INTERROGATORY COMMITTEE]; 
see also Yael T. Ben-Zion, The Political Dynamics of Corporate Legislation: Lessons From 
Israel, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 185, 212, 213-214 (2006) (showing how banks 
dominated). 
86 THE REPORT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY INTERROGATORY COMMITTEE, supra note 85, at 9. 
87 Id. at 8. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 32. 
90 Banking (Service to Customer) Law, 5741-1981, 35 LSI 312 (Isr.) (amended 2007). 
91 Id. at § 2(c).  
92 Id. 
93 BANK OF ISRAEL, PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT: DATA ON THE FIRST QUARTER OF THE FEES 
REFORM, Dec. 31, 2008, available at http://www.bankisrael.gov.il/he/NewsAndPublications/ 
PressReleases/Pages/081230h.aspx. 
94 Id. 
95 THE ISRAEL ANTITRUST AUTHORITY, A RULING REGARDING RESTRICTIVE 
ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN THE ISRAELI BANKS RELATING TO THE TRANSFER OF INFORMATION 
ABOUT THE BANKING FEES, Apr. 26, 2009, available at http://archive.antitrust.gov.il/ 
ANTItem.aspx?ID=9880&FromSubject=100047&FromYear=2009&FromPage=0. 
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Antitrust Commissioner published a ruling, in April 2009, that the 
banks were accustomed to exchanging information regarding bank 
charges, which constitutes an illegal, restrictive arrangement.
96
  
Alleged price coordination by the banks was used as a cause of action 




4. Determining the Legal Rule that Applies to 
the Relationship 
In determining the legal rule that applies to the relationship, 
here too the customer is dependent on the bank.  As mentioned 
above, the banking contract is a standard agreement that is drafted in 
advance by the bank.
98
  Even if the bank agrees to conduct 
negotiations with a certain customer regarding the wording of the 
documents, the basis of the negotiations is the original draft that was 
prepared by the bank and clearly protects its interests.
99
  The banking 
contract usually includes a long list of obligations that are imposed 
on the customer.
100
  If a reference appears therein to the bank, this 
usually deals with the rights of the bank vis-à-vis the customer.  
Many of these clauses were recognized as depriving clauses.
101
 
In summary, given the great power inequality between the 
bank and the customer, as well as the customer’s dependency on the 
bank as a provider of vital services, the courts in Israel imposed a 
fiduciary duty on the bank vis-à-vis the customer.  The fiduciary duty 
 
96 Id. 
97 See, e.g., File No. 2133/06 District Court (TA), Sharnoa Computerized Machs. Tel 
Aviv Ltd. v. Bank Hapoalim Ltd. (2008), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.) 
(approving the submission of a class action involving the coordination of interest rates).  For 
cases filed pursuant to the Antitrust Authority ruling see DC (TA) 6472/08 Levy v. Mizrahi 
Tefahot Bank Ltd. (Isr.); DC (TA) 8700/09  Kosterinski v. Bank Leumi Le-Isr. Ltd (Isr.). 
98 Standard Contracts Law § 2. 
99 Sh.A.P. Ltd., 57(6) PD at 788 (ruling that the bank, as the party that had the power to 
formulate the contractual terms as it wished, was under a duty to provide appropriate 
protection for the legitimate interests of the weaker party). 
100 Id. 
101 See 195/97, The Att’y Gen. (ordering clause removal or alteration after a Tribunal 
examination of a standard checking account agreement found these clauses deprived 
customers); CA 6916/04 Bank Leumi; see also Standard Contracts 8002/02 Standard 
Contracts Tribunal, Supervisor of Banks (finding that many of the clauses in a housing loan 
agreement deprived customers of their rights); File No. CA 232/10 First Int’l Bank Ltd. v. 
Supervisor of Banks (2012), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.). 
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serves as a means to curb the bank’s power and to prevent it from 
being abused to the detriment of the customer. 
C. The Scope of the Duty 
During the last two decades, Israeli courts have broadly 
implemented the bank’s fiduciary duty.
102
  The fiduciary duty applies 
to each and every customer: whether he is an individual or a 
corporation; whether he is a business customer or a private customer; 
whether he is an ordinary customer without financial experience; or a 
sophisticated customer who is familiar with the banking and financial 
world.  The fiduciary duty will apply even to customers who have 
financial power that can be likened to the strength of the bank.
103
  
Every customer, by virtue of his very status as a customer, is entitled 
to a fiduciary duty. 
The bank’s fiduciary duty is broad from an additional aspect: 
the type of activities to which it applies.  The duty applies to the 
types of banking services, activities, and transactions that the bank 
performs on behalf of the customer.
104
  The duty arises from the 
existence of a bank-customer relationship.  The relationship between 
the parties, by its very definition, is what imposes the fiduciary duty, 
and not a specific action that the bank wishes to perform. 
D. Remedies for Breach of the Fiduciary Contract 
The breach of the fiduciary duty by the bank grants the 
aggrieved customer a broad range of remedies.  Thus, the Israeli 
Supreme Court has ruled: 
This relationship between the bank and its customer is 
perceived in law as a special fiduciary relationship 
which imposes more onerous duties on the bank . . . .  
[A]ny breach of these duties, by the bank, could 
provide the customer with a wide range of remedies, 
beginning with a declaration that the activities 
 
102 See Mizrahi United Bank, 54(2) PD at 161-62; Tefahot, 48(2) PD 573, 594-95; Plato-
Shinar & Weber, Three Models, supra note 48, at 429. 
103 Plato-Shinar & Weber, Three Models, supra note 48, at 429. 
104 Tefahot, 48(2) PD 573, 594-95; BEN-OLIEL, BANKING LAW, supra note 78, at 102-05; 
Plato-Shinar & Weber, Three Models, supra note 48, at 429 (describing the scope of the 
bank’s fiduciary duty). 
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performed in his accounts are null and void, through 
operative financial remedies according to which the 
bank will be required to pay the customer in respect of 
damages caused to him, and culminating in 
declarations of the right of setoff, which is available to 
a customer in certain circumstances, in terms of which 




Similarly, it has been ruled that the results in respect to the breach of 
the bank’s fiduciary duty 
varies according to the context in which the issue 
arises.  Sometimes nonfulfillment of the duty results 
in the payment of compensation or ordering 
enforcement, sometimes in the denying of 
compensation or enforcement from the party in 
breach, or negating the power given to the party in 
breach pursuant to the contract, and sometimes the 
outcome is that the activity performed in breach of the 




From the foregoing, it is evident that in cases of breach of the bank’s 
fiduciary duty, a wide variety of remedies are available to the 
customer.  The existence of such a basket of remedies ensures 
effective protection of the customer and is suitable for the special 
contract that exists between the parties.  Not only does it enable the 
customer to sue for the relief appropriate to his needs according to 
the circumstances of the case, but it also allows the court flexibility 





105 File No. CA 8409/04 Yaacovi v. Isr. Disc. Bank Ltd. (2007), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription) (Isr.). 
106 DC (TA) 5295/88 Israel Disc. Bank Ltd. v. Himi, PM 1991(2) 421, 440 (1991) (Isr.). 
107 Plato-Shinar, An Angel Named “The Bank,” supra note 3, at 37-38 (discussing the 
remedies available to a customer for a bank’s breach of its fiduciary duty).  Two additional 
remedies for breach of a fiduciary duty should be mentioned: disgorgement of profits and 
equitable compensation.  Id.  But these remedies are granted only in exceptional cases where 
a serious breach of a fiduciary duty has been committed deliberately.  Id.  These remedies 
have not yet been applied against a bank in Israel. 
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IV. THE DUTY OF DISCLOSURE: GENERAL CONTRACTUAL 
APPROACH VERSUS FIDUCIARY APPROACH 
In order to understand the differences between the general 
contractual approach and the fiduciary approach, this Part examines 
the duty of disclosure in a test case. 
A. The Duty of Disclosure Under the General 
Contractual Approach 
Various legal systems are divided on the question of whether 
a duty of disclosure arises between parties who are about to enter into 
an agreement.  In the United States, the answer is usually negative.
108
  
However, in Israel, a contractual duty of disclosure does exist.
109
  
Section 12 of the Contracts (General Part) Law 1973, which adopted 
the principle of good faith (bona fides) from the Continental Law, 
states: “In negotiating a contract, a person shall act in customary 
manner and in good faith.”
110
  The courts have interpreted this 





108 Compare SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS 567 (4th ed. 2003) [hereinafter WILLISTON & LORD, A TREATISE] (recognizing 
that there is not a duty of full disclosure); and JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO 
ON CONTRACTS 302 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON 
CONTRACTS] (comparing the duty to disclose to a game of poker and noting that no such duty 
exists); JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 28.20 (2012) [hereinafter PERILLO, 
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS]; and E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (4th ed. 2004) 
[hereinafter FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS], with JACK BEATSON, ANDREW S. BURROWS & JOHN 
CARTWRIGHT, ANSON’S LAW OF CONTRACTS 332, 345, 347 (29th ed. 2010) [hereinafter 
BEATSON ET AL., ANSON’S LAW]; and HUGH BEALE ET AL., 2 CHITTY ON CONTRACTS 511 
(30th ed. 2008); and G.C. CHESIRE & C.H.S. FIFOOT, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 336, 372 (15th 
ed. 2007) (showing an approach that suggests widening the contractual duty of disclosure in 
different contexts, including the banking context). 
109 Contracts (General Part) Law § 12 (requiring good faith). 
110 Id.  “An obligation or right arising out of a contract shall be fulfilled or exercised in 
customary manner and in good faith.”  Id. at 123, § 39; see also PERILLO, CORBIN ON 
CONTRACTS, supra note 108, at § 11.38 (discussing development of good faith in American 
contract law). 
111 See Supreme Court Tefahot Mortgage Bank Ltd. v. Netzer, 43(3) PD 828, 835 [1989] 
(Isr.) (“One of the main purposes of Section 12 is to prevent cases in which one of the 
parties to a negotiation permits the other party to be trapped by his own erroneous 
assumptions.  Section 12 demands that the party, who is in possession of the information, 
eliminate any error made by the other party.”); see also FRIEDMAN & COHEN, CONTRACTS, 
supra note 10; SHALEV, THE LAW OF CONTRACT, supra note 12, at 149-51; Sinai Deutch, 
Protection of the Bank Customer, supra note 78. 
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In addition, section 15 of the Contracts (General Part) Law 
which has the heading “deceit,” states: 
A person who has entered into a contract in 
consequence of a mistake resulting from deceit 
practised upon him by the other party . . . may rescind 
the contract.  For this purpose, “deceit” includes the 
non-disclosure of facts which according to law, 





However, the scope of the duty of disclosure under these sections is 
not clear.  The principle of good faith is rather amorphous, and 
despite attempts of the courts to define it in concrete terms, its scope 
remains vague.
113
  Section 15, which is apparently drafted in a more 
concrete manner, still does not make it totally clear when a proactive 
duty of disclosure would arise. 
A similar problem exists under the Banking (Services to 
Customer) Law.  Section 3 prohibits misleading by stating: “A 
banking corporation shall do nothing—by any act or omission, in 
writing, orally or in any other manner—that is likely to mislead a 
customer as to anything material to the performance of a service to 
him.”
114
  The section continues by providing a list of examples of 
matters that are regarded as material, including the nature of the 
service, its price, the yield and benefit that can be derived therefrom, 
the conditions of responsibility for the service, etc.
115
 
However, it is not clear from the wording of section 3 of the 
Banking (Service to Customer) Law as to whether it imposes a 
positive duty of disclosure on the bank.
116
  The question becomes 
even more acute due to another section in the same law.  Section 5 of 
the Banking (Service to Customer) Law authorizes the Governor of 
the Bank of Israel to publish rules of “proper disclosure” for the 
 
112 Contracts (General Part) Law § 15; see also FRIEDMAN & COHEN, CONTRACTS, supra 
note 10, at 810 (analyzing this section); SHALEV, THE LAW OF CONTRACT, supra note 12, at 
317-21. 
113 SHALEV, THE LAW OF CONTRACT, supra note 12, at 103. 
114 Banking (Service to Customer) Law § 3. 
115 See id.; see also Contracts (General Part) Law § 15 (listing examples); Plato-Shinar, 
The Bank’s Fiduciary Duty, supra note 43. 
116 Plato-Shinar, The Bank’s Fiduciary Duty, supra note 43. 
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banks.
117
  By virtue of this power, the Governor published the 
Banking (Service to Customer) (Full Disclosure and Provision of 
Documents) Regulations.
118
  These regulations relate to various types 
of banking services (i.e., deposits, current accounts, provision of 
credit, lease finance, and future transactions) and set forth a long list 
of information the bank must include in a contract relating to each of 
these services.
119
  Nevertheless, these rules are merely technical; they 
cover only certain services and do not impose a sweeping duty of 
disclosure on the banks.
120
  This is also the case with other rules and 
regulations that impose a duty of disclosure on the bank.
121
 
The result is that even under Israeli legislation, which 
contains a relatively broad duty of disclosure between parties to a 
contract—and more specifically between the parties to the banking 
contract—the situation is still not satisfactory from the customer’s 
perspective.  The solution can be found in the form of a fiduciary 
duty.  As will be shown below, the fiduciary approach imposes a very 




117 Banking (Service to Customer) Law § 5. 
118 Banking (Service to Customer) (Full Disclosure and Provision of Documents) 
Regulations, 5752-1992 (1992) (Isr.). 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 E.g., Banking (Early Repayment Fees), 5762-2002 (2002) (Isr.); Supervisor of Banks: 
Proper Conduct of Banking Business Regulations, Regulation 451 on “Procedures for 
Extending Housing Loans” (2006) (Isr.), available at http://www.boi.org.il/en/BankingSupervision/ 
SupervisorsDirectives/ProperConductOfBankingBusinessRegulations/451_et.pdf (creating 
duty to provide information regarding housing loans); Banking (Service to Customer) Law § 
5A (imposing a duty of disclosure regarding bank fees); Banking (Service to Customer) 
(Bank Fees) Rules 5768-2008 (2008) (Isr.); Credit Card Regulations, 5746-1986 (1986) 
(Isr.) (creating duty to provide data pertaining to fees that are charged to customers).  For 
comparison, the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006), obligates American banks 
to provide consumers with meaningful information about credit transactions and requires 
uniform disclosure of credit terms, including an annual percentage rate as defined in the act.  
Truth in Lending Regulation (Regulation Z), 12 C.F.R. Part 1026; Truth in Savings Act, 12 
U.S.C. § 4301 (2006) (requiring depository institutions to disclose fees, interest rates, and 
other terms concerning deposit accounts to consumers before they open accounts; depository 
institutions must also provide periodic statements to consumers that include information 
about fees imposed, interest earned and the annual percentage yield); Truth in Savings 
Regulation (Regulation DD), 12 C.F.R. Part 1030. 
122 Various legal systems concur that when a fiduciary relationship exists between the 
parties, a duty of disclosure will arise.  See, e.g., WILLISTON & LORD, A TREATISE, supra 
note 108, at 572-73, 590-96 (adding that a duty of disclosure may arise not only when a 
definite fiduciary duty existed between the parties, but also when a party to a contract 
expressly reposed trust and confidence in the other party or where the contract or transaction 
was intrinsically fiduciary and, therefore, required perfect good faith); see also PERILLO, 
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B. The Duty of Disclosure According to the Fiduciary 
Approach 
The fiduciary approach imposes a duty on the bank to 
disclose any information to the customer that would be essential to 
the customer when making a decision about performing a banking 
transaction.
123
  The duty is not limited to the details included in the 
various statutory and regulatory provisions regarding disclosure but 
is much wider.  The fiduciary approach imposes a positive obligation 
on the bank to deliver all of the essential information regarding the 
transaction, in order to prevent a situation where the customer takes 




According to the fiduciary approach, the duty of disclosure is 
broad in several aspects.  Firstly, logic demands that the duty of 
disclosure relate only to information that is external to the contract.  
The assumption is that the matter that should be disclosed is hidden 
from the customer’s knowledge while the stipulations of the contract 
are disclosed to the customer.
125
  But, under the fiduciary approach, 
the duty of disclosure includes an obligation not only to disclose 
information that is external to the contract, but also various 
provisions of the contract.
126
  The duty of providing information that 
is imposed on the bank must include providing—or “detailing”—the 
contents of the contract and the bank must be meticulous about 
pointing out essential information, even though such information is 
included in the banking agreement.
127
 
                                                                                                                                      
CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS, supra note 108, at 305 (adding that the duty of 
disclosure “extends somewhat beyond such relationships.  Whenever one party to a 
transaction justifiably believes the other is looking out for his or her interests, a duty of 
disclosure arises”); PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 108, at 93; FARNSWORTH, 
CONTRACTS, supra note 108; BEATSON ET AL., ANSON’S LAW, supra note 108, at 334, 340-
41, 512; FRIEDMAN & COHEN, CONTRACTS, supra note 10, at 577-80, 824-25. 
123 Plato-Shinar, The Bank’s Duty, supra note 70, at 433. 
124 Id.  The scope of the duty of disclosure under the fiduciary approach is dynamic and 
varies according to the particular circumstances of the case. 
125 ORNA DEUTCH, CONSUMERISM, supra note 75, at 355; FRIEDMAN & COHEN, 
CONTRACTS, supra note 10, at 582. 
126 FRIEDMAN & COHEN, CONTRACTS, supra note 10, at 586.  The authors note that in a 
fiduciary relationship, when one party trusts the other party regarding the drafting of the 
contract, and the latter, while taking advantage of this trust, includes a clause in the contract 
that works to the detriment of the other party, this amounts to a breach of the duty of good 
faith.  Id. 
127 Id. 
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Secondly, not only factual information should be disclosed.  
Sometimes, a duty is imposed on the bank to provide the customer 
with legal information as well.
128
 
Thirdly, the duty to provide information should not be limited 
to the pre-contractual stage in which the customer considers whether 
to enter into the banking agreement.  In several instances, the bank 
should be required to provide the customer with information and 
reports during the term of the contract.  Various banking services, 
such as managing a current account, managing financial deposits, and 
establishing a loan, are by their very nature ongoing services that will 
likely continue for many years.  The duty of providing information 
will apply to the bank over the lengthy period of this relationship as 
well. 
Fourthly, the initiative for the disclosure process must come 
from the bank itself.  Even if the customer never approaches the bank 
for information, this does not exempt the bank from its duty, nor does 
it limit the extent of the bank’s responsibility.  A bank that does not 
provide the full information required, of its own initiative, bears the 
responsibility for its omissions. 
The Israeli courts, though recognizing the banking contract as 
a fiduciary contract, have indeed imposed a wide duty of disclosure 
on the banks.
129
  Nevertheless, the Israeli Supreme Court recently 
adopted a different approach in Mercantile Discount Bank Ltd. v. 
Meonot Ezrat Israel Bnei Brak.
130
  In this case, a business customer 
of the bank, a non-governmental organization, had deposited a large 
number of post-dated checks in its account in the past.
131
  Each check 
that was deposited in the account was recorded on a separate line.
132
  
The bank, having always charged its customers a “line entry fee,” 
charged the customer a separate fee for each line, and, accordingly, 
 
128 Id.  The legal information may include information pertaining to early repayment of 
the loan and information pertaining to the ability to “break” a deposit and withdraw the 
money before maturity.  Id.  In Israel, this includes information relating to special protection 
that is granted by law to a mortgagor of a residential property, information about special 
protection that the law grants to guarantors, etc.  FRIEDMAN & COHEN, CONTRACTS, supra 
note 10, at 586. 
129 The leading case is Tefahot, 48(2) PD 573, 596-98. 
130 File No. ACA 4619/08 Mercantile Disc. Bank Ltd. v. Meonot Ezrat Isr. Bnei Brak 
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for each check.
133
  At some point, the customer learned that the bank 
allowed its customers to record all post-dated checks bearing the 
same date together in the same line—a method that reduced the 
fee.
134
  However, this was only done if the customer specifically 
requested it.
135
  The customer argued that the bank’s failure to inform 
it of such a possibility amounted to misleading under section 3 of the 
Banking (Service to Customer) Law and since the bank had acted in 
this way, not only with respect to that customer but also with respect 
to many other customers, the customer filed a class action against the 
bank.
136
  The Supreme Court rejected the action, holding that no 
misleading had taken place because there was no duty on the bank to 
inform the customer that a different method of performing bank 
transactions could save the customer fees.
137
 
This ruling reflects a narrow approach of the Court to the 
notion of misleading and is unusual in relation to the prevailing case 
law.  The explanation for such a result might be the filing of the 
action as a class action.  Israeli courts are conservative regarding 
class actions and tend to reject them even when class actions are 
justified.
138




C. The Duty to Provide an Explanation 
The purpose of the abovementioned duty of disclosure is to 
give the customer all the information necessary for him or her to 
make a wise decision regarding the banking transaction.  
Nevertheless, even if the bank fulfills the aforesaid duty, there will be 
some customers who fail to understand the essence of the transaction 




135 ACA 4619/08 Mercantile Disc. Bank. 
136 Id. 
137 Ruth Plato-Shinar, Israel: The New Law on Class Actions, J. BUS. L. 527, 528 (2007). 
138 Id. 
139 Another example of a class action that was based on the cause of action of misleading 
and that was dismissed by the Supreme Court due to its narrow approach is ACA 8851/02 
Isracard v. Shlomovitz 59(3) P.D. 422 [2004] (Isr.).  This case dealt with inaccurate 
information in the standard credit card application form.  Id.  Since the plaintiff did not 
actually read the form before signing it, it was ruled that he did not rely on any misstatement 
and therefore was not misled by the company.  Id. 
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Such customers require an additional explanation in a language and 
on a level that is suitable to them. 
According to Israeli contract law, there is no duty on one 
party to a contract to explain the contents of the contract to the other 
party.
140
  Negligence of a party to a contract stemming from their 
lack of understanding of the contents of the transaction is that party’s 
responsibility alone.
141
  A person is deemed to be one who knows 
and understands the contents of a document that he or she signs and 
any claims by the person that this is not so will not be accepted.
142
  It 
was even held that a person who signs a document without 
understanding any of the terms and conditions thereof, and without 
seeking any explanation from the other party, acts in prima facie bad 
faith because they represent that they agree to and accept all the 
terms and conditions of the document.
143
 
However, a different rule should be established with respect 
to banking contracts as fiduciary contracts.  A special duty is 
imposed on the bank to provide an explanation to the customer.  
Even if it is possible to deduce from the banking document itself the 
nature and essence thereof, a duty should be imposed on the bank to 
give the customer a detailed explanation regarding the content of the 
contract and the essence of the transaction.  Furthermore, there will 
be instances where an obligation is imposed on the bank to advise a 
customer and to explain the transaction to him or her, even if the 
customer does not request such an explanation because he or she is 
unaware of how essential the explanation is.
144
  According to the 
fiduciary approach, the bank is under the obligation to clarify the 
essence of the transaction and to provide explanations regarding the 
full significance, consequences, and implications thereof. 
The duty to provide explanations, which is imposed on the 
 
140 ORNA DEUTCH, CONSUMERISM, supra note 75, at 355. 
141 Id. 
142 CA 1548/96 Supreme Court Lupo v. Union Bank of Israel Ltd. 54(2) P.D. 559, 570 
(2000) (Isr.); CA 1513 Supreme Court Datiashvili v. Bank Leumi Le-Israel Ltd. 54(3) P.D. 
591, 594 (2000) (Isr.).  This is also the situation under American law, in the absence of 
special circumstances.  See PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS, supra note 
108, at 342, 346, 347, 355.  However this author notes that fiduciary relationship creates 
exception to the general rule.  In such a case, the contract can be generally avoided by its 
signer on a showing merely that the fiduciary failed to make him aware of the legal 
significance of the signing of the contract.  See id. at 348. 
143 FRIEDMAN & COHEN, CONTRACTS, supra note 10, at 172. 
144 Porath, The Responsibility of the Banks, supra note 70, at 324, 326. 
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bank, should be a broad obligation in various aspects.
145
  Firstly, the 
obligation should apply to information that falls outside the scope of 
the contract, as well as to the content of the contract itself.  Although 
in most cases we can infer from the wording of the document the 
nature and essence thereof, in banking contracts it is necessary to 
broaden the obligation.  The bank is required to explain to the 
customer, properly and clearly, the significance of the document 
which he or she is about to sign, the scope of its application, and the 
possible implications thereof.  The bank does not fulfill its obligation 
by simply relying on the wording of the documents. 
Secondly, the obligation to provide an explanation should not 
be limited to the factual details that are provided by virtue of the duty 
of disclosure in the narrow sense.  The obligation to provide an 
explanation should also include an obligation to provide legal 
explanations.  The bank should also be obligated to give the customer 
an explanation regarding the main legal issues connected to the 
transaction, even though there may be many.
146
 
Thirdly, the duty to provide an explanation is especially 
important where the bank is aware that the contract contains a 
provision that is unusual or differs substantially from those that the 
customer could rightfully expect.  In such a case, the recognition of 
the obligation to provide an explanation also arises because of the 
gap in the parties’ expectations.
147
  The obligation to provide an 
explanation should also be recognized where the bank is aware that 
the customer is not capable of reading the document, for example, 
due to language difficulties. 
The Israeli Supreme Court has already acknowledged a duty 
of explanation in 1975 in the case of Israel Mortgage Bank Ltd. v. 
Hershko.
148
  Hershko dealt with a customer who received a loan from 
the bank.
149
  As a result of various limitations, the loan was 
established through a complex arrangement.
150
  The customer was 
not given a satisfactory explanation as to the essence of the 
 
145 The extent of the duty to provide an explanation is dynamic and varies according to the 
particular circumstances of the case.  See PLATO-SHINAR, THE BANK’S FIDUCIARY DUTY, 
supra note 1, at 29-30. 
146 Plato-Shinar, The Bank’s Fiduciary Duty, supra note 43, at 237. 
147 FRIEDMAN & COHEN, CONTRACTS, supra note 10, at 582, 786-87. 
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transaction and therefore did not understand that the way the loan had 
been established would cause him huge losses.
151
  The Court found 
that the bank had breached its fiduciary duty by failing to provide the 
customer with the full explanation required, even though the 
customer had received personal advice from his attorney.
152
 
For many years Hershko was an isolated case.  However, 
during the last decade the notion of a duty of explanation has gained 
momentum and has been applied in many cases and situations.  It has 
been used more that once with regard to mortgage agreements in 
respect to the family home.
153
  In one case, failure by the bank to 
explain to the debtor that the mortgage agreement contained a waiver 
of statutory protection and that non-payment of the loan would result 
in an eviction and sale by the bank resulted in a ruling that the bank 




The banker-customer relationship is a contractual 
relationship.  Nevertheless, general contract law does not provide the 
customer with adequate protection against the bank.  For this reason, 
the banking contract should be viewed as a special contract—a 
fiduciary contract.  According to this approach, the bank is subject to 
a fiduciary duty towards the customer.  The fiduciary duty imposes a 
very high standard of behavior on the bank, much higher than the 
standard imposed on it by contract law. 
The recognition of the banking contract as a fiduciary 
contract maintains the correct balance between the bank and the 
customer by imposing ethical norms of behavior upon the bank.  The 
adoption of the fiduciary approach would create a better model of 
relationship between the bank and the customer and would lead to a 




153 See, e.g., CA 9136/02 Mr. Money Israel Ltd. v. Reiz 58(3) PD 934 [2004] (Isr.); File 
No. CA 8611/06 Bank Hapoalim v. Martin (2011), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) 
(Isr). 
154 See cases cited supra note 153.  
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